Although the changing relation between private law and the state has become the subject of many debates, these debates are often unsatisfactory. Concepts like "law," "private law," and "globalization" have unclear and shifting meanings; discussions 
I. THEME Europeanization, globalization, and private governance mean different things to different people, but one thing seems clear: they change the role of the state in the world. Legal scholars have analyzed at length the impact these developments have on the law. Most of these studies focus on public, especially constitutional, law; they ask how democracy and proper governance structures can be recre-ated or replaced outside the state. The impact on private law, by contrast, has received comparably less attention, with two exceptions: the (somewhat unspecific) claim that globalization transcends the distinction between public law and private law in a new way," and the (public-law inspired) question to what extent private arrangements can compete with or substitute for the state. 2 The reason for this relative neglect of private law in comparison to public law may lie in two irreconcilable assumptions. The first assumption, frequent among students of globalization, is that private law is not different from public law ("all law is public law"), so private law is automatically included in any analysis of law under globalization. The second assumption, frequent among private-law scholars, is that private law is already independent from the state, so any change in the role of the state has no impact on private law. Both assumptions are plausible, but they are mutually exclusive: private law can be bound to the state like public law or be separate, but not both. 3 More importantly, both assumptions have different implications for private law: if private law is public law, then a changed role of the state implies a change for private law; if private law is independent of the state, no such change ensues. This suggests that it matters which of the assumptions (if any) is correct, and that the impact of globalization, Europeanization, and private governance on private law deserves special attention. To what extent is the state the blind spot in our thinking about private law? Is private law beyond the state still "law"; is private law within the state still "private"? To what extent does private law presuppose the state; to what extent is it irreconcilable with the state? To what extent can private law in the "postnational constellation" learn from its experience before and within the state?
This article, together with a companion piece, 4 addresses these questions by looking at American and German concepts and views, in particular. This is no easy task. Core concepts are unclear; several debates exist with no clear connection to each other; normative and analytical perspectives are confused. In this situation, these two articles cannot provide definite answers to the various questions involved. Their more modest, but all the more important, aim is to survey and organize the separate discussions and unveil internal connections between them, so the questions raised can be addressed in a more comprehensive and productive manner. Whereas the other article provides a historical and comparative analysis of the issues involved, this article will collect, analyze, and structure the different debates in legal theory and comparative law concerning the effects Europeanization, globalization and privatization have on private law.
The article is organized as follows. Part II shows traditional views of the relation between private law and the state. It demonstrates how traditional definitions of, and relations between, the central concepts "private law" and "state" differ, both within and between U.S. and German legal discourses; it also discusses the thesis of the simultaneous rise of the state and decline of private law. Part III describes the developments that have called the traditional views into question, grouped under three headings: Europeanization, globalization, and privatization; it also discusses the counter-thesis of a simultaneous decline of the state and rise of private law. Part IV describes four issues that arise because of these developments that would have seemed less problematic under the traditional views: the validity, method, legitimacy, and autonomy of private law. Part V describes various responses to these issues and groups them into types of answers according to the respective role of the state. Although the point of this article is not how one should respond, some important insights that should shape future debates do emerge; these are distilled in Part VI. This is a survey article, an effort to map a number of debates and viewpoints; it is not a position paper. Many views are presented because they are relevant or prominent in debates, not because we share them; we take no position on their value. The extensive footnotes in this article serve not only as references for statements in the text, but also as entry points into different aspects of the academic debate. In addition, the article makes three contributions. First, this article brings together the various themes and aspects connected with the topic of private law and the state under the influence of Europeanization, globalization, and privatization. Although individual aspects have often been discussed in different places, this is the first attempt to combine them in one framework. Second, we suggest that most of the writing on this topic can best be understood in terms of the issues that the article distinguishes and describes. Too many discussions suffer from participants inadvertently using different or unclear concepts. While it is not necessary (or even desirable) to confine debate to only one meaning, awareness of the different meanings is necessary to avoid misunderstandings. To this end, the article proposes a conceptual clarification of key notions in the debate-"private law" and "state," as well as "Europeanization," "globalization," and "privatization"-that should be of use beyond the immediate purposes of the rest of the article. Third, this article suggests how one should categorize both the problems the modern developments create and the solutions that these problems might call for. It does not attempt to analyze which solution is the best one. But in unveiling common structures both within and between the various debates, it should help significantly in rationalizing the further discussion of these solutions.
II. CONCEPTS
Even within the Western legal tradition, 5 the relationship between private law and the state is not uniform. Not only has it changed over time, but it is also viewed differently among different countries. A comparison between U.S. and German approaches, especially, reveals enlightening similarities and differences, since both the state and the idea of private law have been differently defined and have played different roles in German and American legal discourses.
A. Private Law
Comparatists have found that the concept of private law, and its distinction from public law, play a far greater role in Europe than in the United States, and they have sought historical and institutional reasons for this. 6 However, they have widely avoided a logically prior issue: what is meant by private law in the U.S. and in Germany, respectively. 7 When we speak of private law, we often assume, implicitly, the existence of a universal core meaning for the term, one typically focused on contracts and contract law. Yet beyond such a core meaning, it is not even clear whether private law always means the same thing within one legal tradition, let alone among different traditions.
Traditionally, private law rests on the law of obligations (both contractual and non-contractual), the law of property (including succession law), and the law of persons (including family law). It includes those areas of commercial law that extend the law of contracts (e.g., the law of unfair competition), the law of property (e.g., intellectual property) and the law of persons (e.g., corporate law). It excludes those areas that are not based on such extensions and are therefore seen as (merely) regulatory public law (e.g., antitrust law). This traditional definition holds, generally, for most purposes in American and German law. 8 However, once scholars on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean went further and formulated criteria to define private law, usually in opposition to public law, they found important differences. 9 These criteria are important in two ways. First, they define the object of private law debate-what counts or does not count as private law. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they define what makes private law specific-what its inner rationalities are. In fact, a comparative survey reveals no less than seven different concepts, and shows their respective roles are different in Germany and the U.S.1 0 1. Private Interests. In the 3rd century A.D., Ulpian defined private law as the law that concerns private, as opposed to public, interests.' 1 In Germany, this is still one of the most frequently articulated distinctions between private and public law. In the U.S., Ulpian's def- (1904) .
10.
For the purpose of this article, we neglect the U.S. concept of "private laws" as laws for the benefit of specific individuals, as opposed to "public laws" applicable to all individuals. The term and its definition can be found in BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES 85 (1st ed. 1765); its origins go back to the earliest times of statutory law. For much of the 19th century, this was the nearly exclusive meaning of the term in American judicial opinions.
11. Dig. 98 on public and private law.
inition is rarely found as such, 12 but a similar criterion appears whenever private law is defined as that part of the law that protects and enforces private rights. The practical use of the distinction is limited, since it is widely accepted that all laws serve both private and public interests.1 3 2. Corrective Justice. A second definition gives the first more analytical bite: Private law is the body of those rules aimed at corrective justice, as opposed to rules of public law aimed at distributive justice.1 4 This may explain how tort law can be viewed as public law in the United States (where its function is seen more in the distribution of risks than in the compensation of harm)1 5 and as private law in Germany (where the emphasis is on compensation). At the same time, the example suggests why this definition of private law is problematical, at least as an a priori definition without further elaboration. 6 Most areas of the law are hard to place-tort law is only one example,' 7 even contract law is ambiguous.' 8 Institutions frequently serve both distributive and corrective justice, and it may be artificial if not outright impossible to somehow separate the one from the other. Indeed, some think private law always fulfills both corrective and distributive purposes. 
3.
Relations between Private Parties. According to a third distinction, private law concerns relations between private parties, whereas public law concerns relations that include the state in its role of sovereign (rather than that of a market participant). Although this distinction exists in both legal systems, it seems to have a stronger hold in Germany. 20 Only the German legal system seems to conclude that all relations to the state acting as sovereign are part of public law. For example, contracts between governmental agencies and individuals are, in Germany, undoubtedly part of public law, even if some private law provisions apply to them by analogy.
2 1 By contrast, in the U.S., the rise of the "contracting state" signals transcendence of the public law/private law distinction: when the state regulates by contract, it makes use of private law. 4. Horizontality. A fourth distinction generalizes the third: private law is characterized by horizontal relations of equality; public law is characterized by a vertical relation of subordination and dominance. Whether the state acts through private or through public law depends on whether the partner on the other side is treated as a coequal or as a subject. More importantly perhaps, this theory makes it possible to characterize relations between private parties as public law if they are characterized by subordination and dominance, as in, for example, employment contracts. As a consequence, public law restraints on government action can be applied to powerful private actors-corporations in particular-as well. The theory is usually modified to exclude this possibility, but the integration of public law considerations into imbalanced private relationships is still discussed.
5. Private Ordering. A fifth tradition equates private law with private ordering. Since private ordering concerns the distribution of goods, services, and capital through contracts, contracts and property are the core elements of private law in both the U.S. and Germany. But private ordering can encompass other areas of the law as well, and this is where the definition plays out differently in these two legal systems. In Germany, it is used to define private law in a general sense as areas of the law that are typically open to private ordering. The U.S. definition, by contrast, looks at individual rules and relations. This makes for a subtle but important difference: In the U.S. legal system, the core of private law is the contract. In consequence, 20. For an (unsuccessful) all matters become private law once they can be regulated through party autonomy. 23 In this reading, mandatory norms of contract law are not private law, 2 4 whereas consensual agreements between citizens and public entities are; family law is private law to the extent it rests on private agreements. 25 By contrast, the core of German private law is not the contract 26 but the law of contract. In consequence, private law encompasses all other areas of the law that are closely related to contract law-the law of non-contractual obligations, property law, and-though for somewhat different reasons-family law 2 7 and the law of successions. Whether the norms in these areas are mandatory or not is irrelevant to their classification as private law. On the other hand, contracts with the government are public law.
6. Privately Made Law. A related sixth distinction exists between privately made law-norms created by private parties-and publicly made law-norms created by the state. In U.S. literature, such privately made norms are now repeatedly referred to and discussed as law.
2 8 By contrast, German scholars predominantly confine the notion of privately made "law" to law made on the basis of powers delegated by the state. 
Jurisdiction of General Courts.
A seventh distinction is not jurisprudential but jurisdictional: in Germany, private law matters are dealt with in ordinary courts, whereas public law matters go to special courts. 3 0 Whether an issue belongs to private law or public law is thus a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction; in turn, the definition of private law can draw on whether the general courts assert jurisdiction. 3 1 In the U.S., by contrast, suits in general courts against the government have been an important part of the common law for a long time (although so-called administrative law judges, quasi-judicial agencies established outside the judicial branch, hear many disputes between government agencies and those affected by decisions of these agencies).
3 2 Thus, the question of jurisdiction creates a difference between Germany and the U.S., but its impact is not absolute, especially regarding the procedural treatment of private and public law. On the one hand, the German principle of a unitary legal order (Einheit der Rechtsordnung) 3 3 requires like treatment of public and private law when appropriate, so significant parts of Germany's procedural law are similar for general and for administrative courts. On the other hand, public law can trigger special sets of procedure in the U.S. even though no special public law courts exist. 3 4 It should be clear that these concepts, although they overlap (and it would be interesting to analyze in what ways they are interconnected), must be held apart if debates are to be fruitful. Even more important for the purpose of this article may be the finding that, although all these differentiations appear both in U.S. and in German legal discourse, they appear in very different ways. when they use a term like private law; it suggests a different understanding in Germany and in the U.S. of law in general and the place of private law within it. Grossly simplified, in Germany, the core of the law is private law and the rest is contingent politics; 3 5 in the U.S., the core of the law is public (regulatory) law and the rest is contingent private ordering. 3 6 As a consequence, the difference between private and public law is in Germany largely defined from the side of private law, 3 7 and in American common law from the side of public law. Public law in Germany appears as that part of the law that the state makes (other than the mere restatement of private law in the form of codification). By contrast, private law in the U.S. refers not to a separate body of law but rather to a private sphere that the state either willfully grants or in which it must not interfere under some constitutional or natural-law principles.
Although such a general statement is too broad to apply to every instance, some examples 3 8 may illustrate the thesis. For example, when Robert Ellickson describes the informal relations and agreements between neighbors as "order without law," 3 9 much of this is, from a German perspective, law without enforcement-that the neighbors do not resort to courts or written agreements does not mean that their relations are not governed by (private) law. Similarly, when Stuart Macaulay describes a number of informal agreements and enforcement measures between business people as "noncontractual relations in business," 40 a German lawyer would view many of these relations as contracts. It appears that U.S. discourse, 37. With the exception of subject matter jurisdiction (the sixth distinction supra), which is discussed in administrative law more than in private law.
38. One may object that both examples concern outside perspectives on the law, from economics and sociology, respectively. We would respond that both examples are core texts within American legal discourse; that they take an interdisciplinary approach merely reflects the more interdisciplinary character of U.S. legal studies. [Vol. 54 in focusing on the enforcement of law, has a more limited concept of law (especially of private law) than her German colleague to whom enforcement is not a necessary element of private law.
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The main reason is that law and its enforcement are separated in a much stricter form in Germany than in the common law. This means that German jurists can focus on the law regardless of its enforcement, making it a true private law detached from the state. By contrast, in the common law tradition, the partial conflation of law and enforcement, of rights and remedies, adds at least one necessary element of "public" law into "private" law: its enforcement.
A second explanation for the difference concerns the respective role of judges and academics in U.S. and in German private law traditions. German legal science developed in times of frequent changes of the political landscape; in such a setting, public law was everchanging, while private law was a continuum apt for academic studies. 4 1 By contrast, the common law developed largely in the hand of judges, who were long more interested in matters of pleading and procedure than in a coherent underlying substantive private law. This can also explain why private law plays a lesser role in the United States in general.
B. State
There is a third plausible reason why private law has different roles and meanings in the U.S. and in Germany: the state has a different role and meaning as well.
4 2 With the caveat accompanying all generalizations, when Germans speak of "the state," they refer to the comprehensive whole, the collective entity that transcends the particulars. 43 Debates over the law largely take place within the state framework. By contrast, Americans speak of government rather than of the state; the idea of the all-encompassing state is far less frequent in American debates. 44 The distinction is significant: unlike the state, government is undoubtedly separate from society, and it is also separate from the law. Government may restrict the freedom within society (in a Hobbesian construction) or enable it (in a Lockean construction), but society could exist without it. By contrast, the idea legal sanctions to induce performance of the exchange or to compensate for non-performance"; see id. at 56. 1179 (1994) .
that a society requires a state is more plausible, and indeed more common, in Germany. Similarly, the government is not only separate from the law but indeed is bound by it, not unlike private citizens. In the U.S., this means that the government (and its members) can be sued in the same way (and before the same courts) as private individuals; where they are protected by sovereign immunity, this protection is based on their functions, not their nature. By contrast, whether "the state" is bound by the law is a more difficult question-if the state is all-encompassing, then by definition it encompasses the law as well. Neither the distinction nor its significance should be overrated. First, the meaning of state and government is ambivalent in both discourses: Germans will sometimes refer to government as state; Americans will sometimes use state in the broader meaning that it has in German discourse. Second, the distinction is not relevant everywhere: when Germans advocate a weak state and Americans a weak government, they mean the same thing. Nonetheless, the distinction is real and has implications on the view of the law's relation to the state. In German discourse, even where state and law are not synonymous (as they were for Kelsen) 46 they are very close.
4 7 Ideals of law are discussed under the idea of Rechtsstaat -even terminologically, the idea of a legal order is bound to the state. 4 8 By contrast, when American authors call the relation between state and law a perennial theme, 4 9 they usually refer to European debates. Here, two practical questions are more important: whether the government is bound by the law, and whether individuals can appeal to institutions (courts) for protection of their rights. U.S. discourse has two equivalents to the German Rechtsstaat reflecting roughly these two issues: the rule of law (a concept terminologically focused on the government-the ruler-rather than on the state) 5 0 and due process (a concept focused 45 [Vol. 54on protection of the individual against any kind of power). Rechtsstaat is typically confined to "state under the rule of law"; by contrast, translations of "rule of law" into German (Rechtsstaatsprinzip, Rechtsstaatlichkeit) are always linked to the state.
What does this mean for the relation between the state and the private sphere? With all caveats, in Germany, the state was long viewed not as separate from society but rather as its fulfillment. The widespread view that German liberalism of the 19th century established a separation of state and society 51 can be misleading: It conceals the 19th-century notion of co-originality rather than separation of state and society; the state was viewed, then and now, as a creation of society, rather than an antinomy to it.52 More precisely, the socalled separation between state and society signifies in fact a separation between the political sphere and the private spheres of market and family. 5 3 This means that the general idea of the state can remain constant even if the relation between political and private spheres within the state shifts. The change from the 19th-century liberal state to the 20th-century welfare state concerned not the relationship between society and state, but that between the political and the private spheres within the state. Both the liberal state and the welfare state are compatible with the idea, prominent in German thought, that the state is the general representative of collective concerns. The difference is that the liberal state grants a large sphere of autonomy while the welfare state interferes more in this sphere for the greater good, but in both cases the private sphere and its extent are defined by, and exist within, the state.
The situation is different in the United States, where the state is contingent on society. The main achievement of the American Revolution was to get rid of a state (England), and a prime idea be- hind the foundation of individual states and (to a lesser extent) the Union was to protect the private sphere and private rights. This history may explain the restricted view and function of the state; it may also provide one explanation why ideals of anarchy and a society without government and even without state are more common than in Germany (though of course they still represent a minority view.) 5 4 In a sense, the American view of government is almost the flip-side of the German view of the state: whereas the German view places particular interests in the members of society and collective interests in the state, Americans frequently view government as run by special (particular) interests, while general interests are protected only within a society free from the state.
These theses, overly broad as they may be, provide a glimpse of how differently Germans and Americans tend to see the relationship between the state and private law, a difference that mirrors and reinforces the differences between the relation in each nation of public and private law. In Germany, the validity of private law is undoubtedly linked to the state, but this in itself has no implications for whether public or collective concerns play out in private law. 5 5 The state both guarantees freedom and autonomy and protects against the effects of this freedom, especially on weaker parties; private law performs both of these tasks simultaneously. In the United States, by contrast, private law is traditionally viewed as that part of the law that is separate from the state-the common law that has developed largely outside the state, in the courts and in society. As a consequence, the state is viewed as a danger to this freedom, at least when it goes beyond its (allegedly unpolitical) role of enforcing private law.
C. The Rise of the State and the Decline of Private Law?
The rise of the welfare state in the 20th century challenged the substantive autonomy of private law from the state both in the U.S. and in Germany. However, since both private law and state mean different things in the two systems, this challenge has played out differently.
In the United States, few would still defend the autonomy of private law; it is commonplace that the public/private distinction is an illusion. Early in the 20th century, the legal realists dismissed the traditional view of contract and property as private rights that the state must accept and enforce as it finds them, and reinterpreted these rights as public powers vested in rightsholders to engage the state's help in enforcing their interests. 5 6 This reinterpretation influenced both the political left and the political right. 5 7 Critical legal studies (CLS) scholars made the debunking of the public/private divide a centerpiece of much of their thinking and a cornerstone in their argument, if not for a strong state, then at least for a treatment of (apolitical) "private" law as (political) public law. 5 8 Conservative law-and-economics scholars looked at supposedly private law through public eyes, namely through the eyes of overall welfare maximization. 5 9 And they were also critical of the state's role in administering private law, though their criticism went against the regulatory and redistributive state, not against the state that provides and enforces private law.
In this well-known story on the decline of the public/private distinction, four important elements illuminate the peculiar relationship between private law and the state that underlies much of the debate and that is relevant to the themes of this article. First, if the underlying concept of private law is that of private ordering, then what is at stake is not the autonomy but the very existence (or possibility) of private law so defined. A private law instilled with public considerations, so termed, would be a self-contradiction; this conceptual peculiarity may explain much of the harshness in the debate. Second, the public/private distinction is not really transcended (in the sense that each side of the dichotomy is overcome) but rather resolved on the side of public law: all private law is, "really," public law because it implies public interests and distributive considerations. 6 0 Third, be- 422-23 (2006) . But see Freeman, supra note 22, at 564-65 ("Critical legal scholars, building on legal realism, successfully exposed the cause these interests and considerations are located in the state, all private law is state law; 6 1 the focus lies on its role for the regulatory state and on the role of adjudication as effective lawmaking. It follows, fourth, that all the different attacks on the public/private divide come with a certain critique of the role of the state with regard to the law, be it a critique of its laissez-fare ideology, the superstructure it provides, or its undue interference with the free interplay of markets. The left and the right seem to agree not only on private law being on the political right and public law being on the political left, 6 2 but also on the crucial role of the state in this debate. The critique of private law's autonomy presumes a certain role for the state; the critique of the state's role in private law presumes a certain idea of private law.
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In Germany, the public/private divide and its decline have played out differently. Remarkably, the realists' insight that all private law is public law, because the state necessarily intervenes in private relations with its decision to enforce or to abstain from enforcement, had been formulated earlier in Germany 63 but with little effect. 64 The insight had less subversive potential than in the U.S., because the realists' credo that "all private law is really public law" translates, in the German context, into the idea that all private law is really state law-law made and enforced by the state. This is hardly more than a truism for the prevailing German view of the relation between state and law.
In Germany, the debate deals less with the distinction of public and private spheres and its impact on law than with the distinction between private and public law. One relevant debate deals with the role of governmental policies and social values in private law. After early calls for adding "a drop of socialist oil" to the assumed liberal structure of the Civil Code 6 5 remained at first unheeded, the Third incoherence of the public/private divide, revealing that a purely private realm exists only as a legal construct. The flip side of that argument-that a purely public sphere is also illusory-proves equally true, and has gone relatively unnoticed in administrative law.").
61. See, e.g Reich and the German Democratic Republic attempted to put these calls into practice by abolishing the distinction between private and public law, 6 6 with little success. Postwar West Germany took a different path-instead of abolishing the distinction, it enriched traditional private law with substantive values (most notably in consumer and labor law). Ironically, this strengthened rather than weakened the autonomy of private from public law-once these values are developed within private law, outside interference from public law becomes unnecessary. At the same time, this means that private and public law are now able to serve as functional equivalents and mutual residual regimes. 6 7 The legislature may choose a private law or a public law regime to deal with the same problem: accidents, for example, may be dealt with through tort law (arguably private law) or through insurance schemes (arguably public law), but this functional equivalence helps maintain the distinction. 6 8 A second development concerns the intrusion of Constitutional basic rights into private law. The idea of "indirect third-party effects" of the Constitution 6 9 gave Constitutional judges a flexible instrument to instill Constitutional restraints into private law, notably the protection of the weaker party and non-discrimination in contract law. Although some private lawyers violently oppose these influences out of concern for the autonomy of private law, 70 others have welcomed it as a means to fulfill the promises of private law-private autonomy, GERMANY 1914 GERMANY -1945 GERMANY , at 358-62 (2004 liberty-in a fuller sense than a libertarian private law could by itself. Indeed, one may doubt whether basic rights are still specifically public law or whether they are rather fundamental principles that transcend the public/private distinction and permeate the whole legal order.
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This creates two differences between Germany and the United States and one common development. The first difference concerns autonomy from public law: in the U.S., private law (understood as private ordering) lost its autonomy by turning into public law; in Germany, private law (understood as contract, tort, and property law) maintained its autonomy by incorporating public concerns. The second difference concerns the relationship to the state. Whereas critique of private law in the U.S. entails critique of the state that produces and enforces this law, critique of private law in Germany takes the state for granted and takes place within it. 72 The common development often goes overlooked: 19th-century private law was thought to be autonomous from the state: it was conceivable as a transnational body of law; and indeed, foreign law was frequently used in private-law adjudication.
7 3 By contrast, when private law turned into public law or state law, it became domestic law. Now, the framework for debate and reasoning was the state, and foreign law was relegated into comparative law, a separate discipline without immediate normative relevance.
III. DEVELOPMENTS
The traditional views of private law pointed out in Part II are diverse, but they share certain traits: they all depend on the idea that private law is part of a coherent legal system owing its validity and legitimacy to the fact that it is conceived as a coherent whole and enacted or enabled by the state. This Part describes how recent developments call the traditional view into question. To the extent that the European Union shapes private law, private law is not the product of a state, at least in the traditional sense. 7 4 Where private law is created within the plurality of legal orders shaped by globalization, it is [Vol. 54not the product of one state. When private actors or agencies make and enforce their own law, this law is not the product of any state.
A. Europeanization
Europeanization of private law has three different meanings that sometimes overlap but must be held apart for analysis, since the role of private law and the state is different in each of them.
1. European Union. One meaning concerns the growing importance of the European Union, 75 which has recently, after originally dealing with other areas, focused on private law. The view the European Union takes of private law is clearly instrumental-European private law must serve the common market.
7 6 This has different consequences. First, differences between member-state private laws are said to require supranational harmonization of conflict of laws rules.
7 7 Second, private-law norms of member states can violate E.U. law if they interfere with the free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital. This is so not only for mandatory norms 7 8 but even, as has been argued, for non-mandatory, "truly" private, norms. 7 9 Third, because private law is considered relevant for the functioning of a common market, the E.U. has begun to harmonize substantial parts of market-oriented private law through directives.
8 0 Some even argue that differences between the member-state private-law norms require general unification of private law, through either a real codification 81 or a legislative instrument sui generis: a common frame of reference. tage represented in the member states' own private laws or argue that unification is unnecessary in practice. 8 3 Sometimes, U.S. federalism is invoked as a model of non-unified private law, although the situations are not fully comparable, since similarities of legal cultures and styles between the U.S. states are greater than between E.U. member states. 84 The impact on private law and the state is ambivalent. On the one hand, this institutionalized Europeanization reduces the importance of the member states and their private law because they must yield sovereignty to the European Union. On the other hand, the European Union itself in many ways resembles a state, functionally and structurally, whether it is called a state or not. pendence resulting in regulatory competition. 9 5 Proponents hope for a pluralist private law that is autonomous not only from the state but also from judicial and academic interventions, a private law created by, and developing under, the forces of the market. The hypothesis is that states cannot maintain regulatory laws that are inefficient (as is often assumed in the area of private law, where many favor market autonomy over centralized state power), since this would put their corporations at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis foreign participants and might encourage these corporations to relocate. This competitive effect is intensified by party autonomy in choice of law, which gives parties the ability to choose the private law applicable to them and thereby opt out of unfavorable private-law rules. (However, internationally mandatory norms, often the most relevant norms, remain applicable despite a choice by the parties; here, regulatory competition requires parties to relocate physically.)
These three concepts of Europeanized private law imply very different relations between private law and the state. Proponents of academic Europeanization defend a private law that is largely independent of instrumental considerations, a private law with its own logic and rationality. By contrast, the view the European Union takes of private law is not only instrumental-European private law must serve the common market-but also bound to the state-like regulatory functions of the E.U. Regulatory competition presupposes an instrumental private law as well, but with the important difference that the goals are set not by states or the Union but by the inner rationality of the market for legal rules. Not surprisingly, the tensions between these views of Europeanized private law are becoming more and more visible. 
B. Globalization
Attempting to define globalization in the abstract would be less fruitful than identifying where globalization discourse addresses changes in the role of the state that are relevant for private law. Many of these developments-supranational regulation, international unification, regulatory competition-bear some similarity to those under Europeanization. However, since an organization comparable to the E.U. is lacking on the global plane, any concept of global 
Gerhard Wagner, The Virtues of Diversity in European Private
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While these developments could lead to uniformity, global competition between private law regimes would require a plurality of private laws. Such competition differs from that in Europe on a crucial point: an overarching regulatory institution like the European Union is lacking in the global sphere; regulatory competition is unregulated.
1 1 0 This means that states that are strong enough can apply their laws extraterritorially and thereby hamper the possibilities for private parties to opt out of their laws, whether through party autonomy or through physical relocation. We see this in the conduct of the U.S. and the E.U., both of which are unwilling externally to submit themselves to the regulatory competition they require internally from their respective member states."
1 Similarly, the effect of party autonomy is more dramatic than in the European Union. On a global level, party autonomy turns the hierarchical relationship between the state and the individual upside down. In the traditional view, the individual is subordinated to the state, even in the realm of private law. By contrast, party autonomy subordinates the state and its private law to private parties and their choices. Parties are not confined to using the autonomy granted to them by the legal order; rather, they have the autonomy to choose the very legal order that grants this autonomy. All of this means that global private law will likely remain pluralistic and non-hierarchical, an important difference to a hierarchical state-based private law. Some private-law projects in Europe can be viewed as a reaction; they aim, implicitly or explicitly, at protecting European private law with its social aspects against such Americanization, 1 15 while at the same time promoting European (and German) private law as a model for other states. If globalization weakens the power of mid-size states, then both the strengthening of the European Union and the Europeanization of private law can be viewed as reactions to globalization.
11 6 The tension between U.S. and German private law is then also a tension over the role of specific states in private law, not just of the state in the abstract.
C. Privatization
All these developments concern the shift of state power to other states or global institutions. Yet, perhaps the most important development of globalization is the shift away from states altogether towards the private sphere. In a globalized world, in addition to states, an increasing number of non-state institutions-NGOs, multinational corporations, and individuals-are relevant international or transnational actors. 1 17 In various ways and degrees, these have all become not only subjects and objects of international law, but also creators and shapers of law. Since these organizations are private, the resulting law is a kind of privatized private law that is independent from the state to the extent that the state does not interfere and is not required for its enforcement.
1. Transnational Legal Science. One consequence could be the emergence of a transnational legal science with a global academic debate and a worldwide community of courts. While some such developments can be observed in the human rights sector, 1 8 similar developments in private law are made more difficult by the relative lack of common intellectual and cultural roots worldwide; even com-munication between German and U.S. law is sometimes riddled with misunderstandings.' 1 9 Nonetheless, one such development is occurring in the area of commercial law, in the form of academic restatements or private codifications of private law. Modelled after both European national codifications and the American Restatements, several different and sometimes competing private codifications exist on the global level.1 2 0 Whereas European private codifications offer themselves, at least in part, as models for a possible future European codification and thus for incorporation into the political system, worldwide models remain permanently outside the structure of states. They serve either as mere academic constructions or as potentially applicable law for international contracts, most importantly (up until now) in arbitration. 12 1 Formally similar to "official" codifications but lacking a legislator's authority, they present a challenge to traditional concepts of private law: their character as "law" is disputed; their functions oscillate between potential and actual description and prescription. More important is the actual relation of these private orders to the state, especially the question whether they provide the applicable norms in a choice-of-law analysis.1 32 Traditionally, states have been unanimous in rejecting the applicability of non-state private laws in choice of law; 3 3 demands to the contrary 3 4 have so far remained unheeded. This attitude may be changing at least for quasi-official private codifications: a recent proposal for a European regulation on choice of law in contracts would allow parties to choose private codifications like the UNIDROIT Principles over state law as the law applicable to their contracts.' 3 5 This would be a triumph for privately made, non-state law, which could achieve an equal footing with statemade private law. However, it would also be a victory (not yet realized by all) for state-made private law as the model for what can be accepted as law: privatized private law will only be recognized when it appears as a code, sufficiently similar, in form and substance, to state law.
D. The Decline of the State and the Rise of Private Law?
What broader effects do these developments have for private law? Harold Koh convincingly argues that what he calls transnational legal process "breaks down two traditional dichotomies that have historically dominated the study of international [and, one could add, domestic] law: between domestic and international, public and private."1 36 However, whereas Koh follows the legal realists' example' 3 7 and breaks the dichotomy for the benefit of a broadened con- 
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cept of public law, it may be more plausible to turn the realist project on its head and break the dichotomy on the other side: In the domestic sphere, all law may really be public; in the global sphere, all law is, arguably, really private.
1 3 8 The legal realists had to assume, tacitly, that the state is strong enough to regulate all ostensible private law as public law. To view the abstention from intervening in the private sphere as a form of regulation, as Robert Hale did, 1 3 9 makes sense only when this abstention is the result of a political (public) decision, not of inability. Yet inability is exactly what globalists now argue characterizes the state: states are so weak, compared to other, non-state actors on the world scene, that they yield much of their sovereign power to the forces of the market-regulatory competition, public-private partnerships, privatization, etc. 14 0 All domestic law may become public law, but all international law becomes transnational private law.141 It is especially the relative independence from government traditionally enjoyed by private law that makes it a likely candidate for the supranational situation without a government.
Such a rebirth of autonomous private law is reminiscent of the autonomous private law of 19th-century liberalism, but it differs in a crucial way. Then, the autonomy was possible because a strong state was willing and able to grant this autonomy.1 4 2 Now, the monolithic state that could grant this autonomy has given way to a multitude of public and private actors, and the new autonomy of private law takes place not in the presence and under the protection of a state but rather in, and due to, its absence. This makes the idea that private law can remain essentially unchanged both implausible and unattractive. That private law could remain essentially free of "public" values has always been an illusion, but it had at least a grain of plausibility when the provision of such values and control could be exter- 142. This in turn represented an inheritance of earlier times when private law had been largely beyond the reach of public domination; Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4. See also Michaels, supra note 131, at 1236-37.
nalized to the state and to public law. Such externalization has now become more difficult. In the European Union, the task of providing "social values" can be assigned from the member states to the E.U. level, or vice versa, from the E.U. to the member states.143 On a global level, since there is no state to provide essentially "public" values, it is unclear where the public values to enrich and legitimize private law should originate.
14 4
This does not mean that globalized private law cannot contain any values beyond those of the market. Perhaps, the new private law must develop the necessary values within itself, as genuine private law values. Along these lines, proposals have been made to constitutionalize global private law-not in the traditional sense of constraints from an external (state) constitution, but rather, in accordance with the idea of a constitution beyond the state,1 4 5 in the sense that private law must itself turn into a constitutional order.146 Whether globalized private law can develop the necessary values within its own rationality is perhaps the most pressing question.
IV. ISSUES
It should have become clear that private law requires rethinking, especially with regard to its connection to the state. That being so, much of our traditional conception of private law is called into question: its validity as an enactment of the state or a national tradition, its method as a coherent and hierarchical structure, its legitimacy through democratic enactment or as an embodiment of private rights protected by the state, its autonomy as a distinct branch of law.
These issues-validity, method, legitimacy and autonomy of globalized law-are frequently debated with regard to globalization, but typically with a focus on public law. This section highlights the special role of private law with regard to these issues and proposes structures for addressing these issues.
A. Validity
The first question is central especially to German legal thinking: what counts as valid private law. Three concepts must be distinguished: 14 7 juridical validity requires issuance in the duly prescribed way by a duly authorized organ; sociological validity requires that law is effectively obeyed and enforced; ethical validity requires that law is morally justified. Juridical validity of law, including private law, has traditionally been based on the state's authority: even if the state does not create the substance of private law, it is law only because the state accepts it as such. 14 8 This poses obvious problems when private law moves beyond the state.1 4 9
1. Sociological Validity. One answer is to substitute sociological or ethical for juridical validity. Legal pluralists suggest that we recognize privately made norms as law because of their sociological effectiveness. This suggestion is not entirely new-historically, nonstate normative orders have long posed a challenge to the state.' 5 0 Nor does it necessarily lead to radically different outcomes-states have always effectively recognized non-state normative orders even though they denied them the character of "law," notably through incorporation, deference, and delegation.' 5 ' What makes this answer radical is the suggestion to give up the traditional concept of juridical validity and replace it with sociological validity. This has always been perceived as risky, as is evidenced by the historical desire in centuries past to find for the law's validity a juridical criterion of authority beyond effectiveness and correctness, however fictional.1 52 One reason is that social effectiveness is difficult to determine empirically. In addition, to consider a norm legally binding because it is practically effective requires a problematical is/ought crossover.
2. Ethical Validity. Other authors propose a quasi-natural concept of private law beyond the state, based on practical reasoning and 147. ROBERT ALEXY, BEGRIFF UND GELTUNG DES RECHTS 139-43 (4th ed. 2002) [ moral principles, 15 3 and thereby suggest effectively substituting ethical for juridical validity. Such an idea of reasoning underlies not only some proposals for a new ius commune; arguably, a similar idea is implicit in proposals for a global private law based on economic efficiency or global utility maximization as objective goals. Although economics and natural law have vastly different values, both agree that law should be shaped by objective values extrinsic to the lawmaker's description. If private law is autonomous from political considerations, then dispensing with juridical validity may be less problematical than for public law, where a disentanglement of validity from the political process appears more unattractive. Whether private law is, or should be, autonomous in this sense is a different and prior question.
Rethinking Juridical Validity.
Another answer is not to replace juridical validity but to rethink it. If juridical validity is defined through issuance in the duly prescribed way by a duly authorized organ, then it is not necessarily tied to the state-supranational or nonstate organs may be duly authorized as well. However, the criterion of a duly authorized organ raises an immediate follow-up question, both within and outside the state: According to what standard is the organ duly authorized? And how does this standard in turn achieve validity? Obviously, juridical validity leads into infinite chains ofjustification. There are three ways to break such chains: they can be continued into infinity; they can be broken at some point where a foundation is simply assumed as an axiom; or they can become circular.154 Can the chain of justification for private law be continued into infinity? While infinite reasoning is logically impossible, a fiction of infinity is frequently found. The common law, at least in its English version, adopts a variant when its validity is based on tradition since time immemorial. 15 5 Similarly, when the justification for a new ius commune is sought in the long European intellectual tradition, this is based on the fiction of an infinite chain of justification.
More frequent are attempts to break the chain of justification at one point that is used as an axiom. For state private law, this axiom lies typically in the state-in either a Kelsenian Grundnorm or a Hartian rule of recognition. However, there is no good reason why the only Grundnorm or rule of recognition should exist within the state- 155. Under English common law, customs could be recognized as law if they had existed since "time immemorial." Although this appears to represent an infinite chain of justification, in fact the chain was broken more or less arbitrarily for the year 1189 by the English Statute of Westminster in 1275. especially for private law, which is already relatively independent from the state. For Europe, some have already argued for an interplay of two Grundnorms-one of the European Union, the other of the member states. 15 6 Moreover, once we establish the Grundnorm as a mere analytical tool, there is no intrinsic reason why it should be confined to traditional states. 1 5 7 The same is true for Hartian rules of recognition. If legal pluralists are correct in stating that people owe allegiance to numerous different normative orders, this suggests the existence of various rules recognition that can validate both state and non-state laws.1 5 8 The result is a situation with multiple overlapping private law orders, arguably not an inadequate conceptualization of global private law.
Finally, circular chains of justification are gaining new attraction for globalization. Autopoietic theory holds that law, in particular private law, is able to create and maintain itself through a self-recurring, autopoietic process.' 5 9 This process gains special force for nonstate law. Since autopoietic theory makes it possible to conceive of various legal orders that establish themselves outside the state, it has, not surprisingly, welcomed globalization discourse (albeit typically under the heading of world society).1 6 0 The law is no longer con- 
B. Method
If private law is plural, this poses challenges for our methods, many of which have been developed in the context of state private law. A debate has begun on whether these methods are still appropriate for private law beyond the state, especially in the European context, 162 but much remains to be done.
Beyond Domestic Law.
A first challenge to traditional methods goes against their domestic character-not only in Germany, where the highest methodological criterion is typically the legislature's real or hypothetical will, but also in the U.S., where the common law is viewed as the expression of a sovereign's will rather than a pie in the transnational sky. This domestic focus must obviously be adapted for binding supranational law. Especially in Europe, this presents challenges regarding the relationship and manifold conflicts between E.U. and national private law. 16 3 However, even beyond such supra-gitimate (with exceptions for fully ineffective or repulsive law). 178 Whether state private law remains legitimate beyond the state is more doubtful. First, state law is typically aimed at domestic situations; arguably, this makes it inappropriate for transnational situations and transactions. Second, if regulatory competition has reduced the states' legislative discretion, states can no longer provide certain norms deemed desirable, for example norms aimed at the protection of weaker parties. This loss of discretion weakens the legitimacy of state private law.
Is private law beyond the state more legitimate? Supranational and transnational private law can take nondomestic concerns into account; this is one reason why many consider treaties like the CISG and private legal orders like lex mercatoria intrinsically superior to domestic private law. Also, since supranational law can provide a framework for regulatory competition between state laws, it can guarantee the protection of the weaker parties. E.U. law, for example, guarantees a certain degree of mandatory consumer protection throughout Europe and thereby isolates it from the effects of competition.
2. Democratic Legitimacy. A general criticism voiced against law outside the state is that such law lacks democratic legitimacy. To some extent, the democratic idea that everybody who is affected by a rule should have a say, at least indirectly, in its creation, can be transferred to the transnational sphere. 1 7 9 The binding force of transnational contracts between the parties, for example, can be legitimized even without a state; the same is true for the application of lex mercatoria to the community of merchants, provided lex mercatoria is truly a creation of the community of merchants. 18 0 However, large areas of law are not rooted in close communities; without a democratic mechanism, it is difficult to ensure that all parties affected by certain norms have a chance to be heard in their creation. Here, disputes over the legitimacy of norms must be resolved by other means-market solutions or ethical discourse.' 8 ' These are important challenges, but arguably, the lack of democratic legitimation presents fewer new problems for private law. At least from a historical perspective, the legitimacy of private law was never fully linked to democracy. Even within the state, the substance of most private law is determined by experts rather than by popular will.
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1 8 2 Moreover, private law has always retained some autonomy from state control:1 83 the common law developed largely outside the government's control, and even codifications have always consisted, to a large degree, of mere restatements of legal developments and ideas developed outside the structures of the state. The codification grants these developments and ideas legislative authority, but it does not prevent subsequent development of the law, which, again, is largely at the hands of courts and scholars. In this historical view, that the new private law lacks democratic legitimacy may seem shocking but is nothing novel. Even in the democratic state, much private law has always drawn at least part of its legitimacy from substantive considerations developed by jurists and judges outside democratically legitimized lawmaking. Remembering this should help address the legitimacy of globalized and privatized private law.
D. Autonomy
A final issue concerns the autonomy of private law-from public law and values, from the state and from politics, and from non-legal disciplines and rationalities.1 8 4 Moving beyond the state has ambivalent results for all three aspects.
On the one hand, there are clear indications that "classical" private law has lost its traditional autonomy. Its autonomy from public law has long been lost in the United States; 8 5 in Germany today, this autonomy is based largely on contingent sociological factors, such as the organization of the judiciary and academia, rather than on intrinsic differences of legal values.' 8 6 Europeanization and globalization may restrict the states' impact on private law, but similar activities are now moving up to transnational bodies, be they the European Union or the World Bank, so autonomy from the political sphere is still not achieved. Finally, doctrine is increasingly relying interdisciplinarily on other sciences, especially on the economic On the other hand, counter-developments may result in an increase of the law's autonomy. For example, if it is true that lex mercatoria and international arbitration serve only individual, private interests, 1 8 9 then this form of private dispute resolution leads to a strict autonomy against all third-party interests and against the public sphere.190 In addition, the emergence of international principles of private law and of transnational legal discourse favors a new autonomy of private law against the state. Once legal knowledge and doctrinal arguments become transnational, they transcend their origin in state laws and become independent not just from individual states but from the state in general. Finally, increasing interdisciplinarity of legal doctrine creates a new kind of autonomy: if economic reasoning now occupies the position that traditional legal doctrine had to give up, 19 1 it also inherits the autonomy previously maintained by doctrinal private law. Legal arguments based on economic analysis make it difficult for the government to interfere with private law, since it is constrained, both in its lawmaking and in the interpretation of its acts, by considerations of economic efficiency.
V. BEYOND THE STATE?
If private law is no longer regarded as autonomous, valid, legitimate, and doctrinally coherent for the same reasons as in the past, we must ask what form it will take in the future. Although the questions and answers collected up until now are diverse, the answers to the various questions can be grouped along the different roles the state plays in them.
A. Revolution
A first possibility is the end of private law, at least as deriving its validity, method, legitimacy, and autonomy from the state. Private transactions might be structured by entirely different means. This first possibility, here called revolution, adopts the (early) views of globalization as decline of the state and rejects concepts of private law insofar as they are based on the state. If Europeanization and globalization lead to a new paradigm of law, then private law can and should be rethought from the ground up. One prognosis in this camp is that law will cease altogether and that private transactions will be structured entirely by non-legal means.1 92 The idea of private law, especially, must yield to instrumental concerns. 193 Another prognosis is that we should stretch our understanding of what constitutes private law beyond traditional boundaries. One example can be found in the idea, prominent for some time in the 1990s, that an entity like the internet not only requires new law but in fact itself constitutes its own legal order, since it regulates and structures private conduct in the same way as private law.1 94 In this view, the internet is viewed as autonomous and independent from the state, indeed as "sovereign"-the state cannot, nor should it, regulate it; the internet regulates itself. Instead of doctrine, the internet uses technological architecture for its creation and maintenance, but this architecture is analogous to legal doctrine:
19 5 access rights are property rights, computers can enter into contracts as agents,' 9 6 and so on. Legitimacy and validity of this autonomous internet lie in an anarchical (i.e., non-state) ideal of self-determination and self-regulation, and in its opportunities for the creation of transnational communities. The virtual worlds of the internet create their own law. 1 9 7
Some may see great creative potential in such debates; others may dismiss them as plainly absurd. Regardless of these evaluations, it is worth remembering that revolutionary fervor often turns into restoration and that predictions that the law is coming to an end have been made again and again in history and so far failed to come true; this makes current predictions for an end of law less likely. 1 9 8 Perhaps all that comes to an end is a certain way of thinking about the law. Similarly, ideas about an autonomous internet as its own normative order have become less plausible once it became clear that traditional law can, and does, regulate the internet. Even the virtual worlds of online games have their ultimate impact in the real world.
B. Resistance
A second possibility is that we may once more regard private law much as we did traditionally. This is the flipside of revolution-resistance, the continuance of private law theory and practice under the state paradigm as before. Resistance is less ignorant than it is sometimes presented. Globalization is not unavoidable or predetermined; it may prove to be overrated.1 99 Especially its impact on the content of private law may be minimal-either because private law has always been detached from the state and is therefore already optimal for globalization, or because a state-based concept of private law can deal perfectly well with the challenges of globalization. The state already has norms for dealing with transnational private law in its rules on conflict of laws; the globalization of conflict of laws (or the use of conflict of laws for globalization) could be a way to keep substantive private law intact. After all, globalization is to no small degree shaped by the conduct of states, and states may well succeed in re-domesticating issues that are currently thought to escape regulation through individual states' private law. [Vol. 54 courts.
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2 0 2 The state might well survive globalization and take its private law with it.
Resistance of traditional private law to globalization may be possible. What seems no longer possible, however, is to conceive of private law as state law as though this were a natural or necessary connection. One irreversible result of globalization and Europeanization discourse is that we can no longer equate law with state law without justification. The forceful defense of national codifications in Germany 2 03 and France 20 4 against the possibility of a European codification is a sign that the need to justify state private law is being recognized.
C. Regression
A third possibility is to deal with the challenges of post-state private law by regressing to the model of pre-state private law.
2 0 5 Private law was once independent from the state-if only because there was no state in the modern sense. Several different concepts of prestate private law, explored at more length elsewhere, 20 6 offer themselves as models for postnational private law. Roman law contains two: a doctrinal private law that exists essentially separately from the state, 2 07 and ius gentium that exists separately even from the Roman society and represents a general private law of the world. 2 08 Medieval European law seems another attractive candidate-the multiplicity of overlapping legal orders and claims to jurisdiction is a feature some find again in globalization, 209 as is the lack of a clear distinction between private and public law. edly) independently from state laws, have found proponents for a rebirth. 2 12 Finally, the common law may offer itself as a model.
13
If these old ideas can be used for our times at all, they require modification. Some of the historical models are themselves doubtful. Whether a substantive lex mercatoria ever existed has become dubious; 2 1 4 the ius commune was a common academic language rather than a uniform set of rules applied uniformly before courts. 2 15 In addition, some of the historical models were based on presumptions and presuppositions that are no longer valid. Natural law has become doubtful because we can agree neither on one transcendent normgiver (let alone on the rules such a norm-giver would create), nor on principles of rationality that are both universal enough to apply to all humanity worldwide and specific enough to create more than just abstract and general principles. Similarly, the faith in the norm-generating force of tradition, underlying both the common law and the historical school in Germany, has been shattered by the ruptures of revolution and perversion of the law. Nevertheless, all these concerns notwithstanding, the detailed historical experience with old versions of non-state private law should be invaluable for a possible new version of non-state private law.
D. Reproduction
A fourth possibility is to reproduce on a supranational level the form of state-based private law with which we are already familiar.
2 1 6 One example is the return of codification. The proclaimed age of "decodification," in which codes became less important and the emphasis of law moved to regulatory statutes, gave way to a recodification: numerous countries are either codifying their private law for the first time, or even reforming their codifications. The European Union for some time seemed willing to codify private law; now it prefers a frame of reference whose only function would likely be to provide a doctrinal and conceptual background for European private law thinking. The World Bank proclaims the "rule of law" as a necessary requirement for economic success, and often this requires the implementation of legal rules. But codification is taking place outside of states and "official law" as well. The lex mercatoria, whose main quality was once said to be its flexibility and independence from doc- 214. Jansen & Michaels, supra note 4, at II.2; Michaels, supra note 124, both with references.
215. Id., text accompanying note 154.
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[Vol. 54trinal concepts, is now being codified-either as relatively static codifications of unclear normative force 2 17 or as "creeping codification." 2 18 The Code, once thought quintessential to private law in the state, is translated into realms outside the state.
Reproduction can be unconscious when scholars apply their traditional understanding without asking to what extent it is based on the state. Yet, reproduction can also be a conscious attempt at translating this understanding to a new environment. Conscious reproduction is frequent in the realm of Europeanization. Since the European Union performs many of the same functions as the nation state on a higher level, 2 19 it is not surprising that much debate on European private law repeats debates of private law within the state. Sometimes such repetition comes explicitly, for example when the codification debate between Thibaut and Savigny is reinvoked 22 0 (which itself was in no small part a debate over the role of the state in the creation of private law). More often, it comes only implicitly, when expectations directed at private law in the European Union mirror those we are used to from the state, without any consideration of the possibly different framework.
Reproducing state-based concepts of private law is not automatically inappropriate beyond the state; the experience from state-based private law is undoubtedly valuable. However, it must be kept in mind that certain background conditions existing within the state are lacking beyond the state, for example a centralized court system, a common legal heritage, and so on. As a consequence, reasoning that makes perfect sense within the state may lose its justification beyond the state. Naive reproduction is likely to be inadequate.
E. Renovation
The four possibilities just mentioned are based in different ways on experience of the past. A fifth possibility is renovation: although the past shapes the future in some way, history will take us in a direction that does not resemble the past and which we cannot envision entirely on the basis of our past experience. In this category of an-swers, the state is just one stage in the development of the world; 22 1 codification is just a ripple in the stream of legal development.
2 22 The common law has always reacted gradually to changes in its environment (even if such change was not always immediately visible).
3
Likewise, the civil law develops over time through judicial and scholarly interpretation-before the code, under the code, and, potentially, after the code.
2 2 4 Our experience with the state makes a simple return to a pre-state situation implausible, but in turn our experience with a pre-state situation may save private law against a possible decline of the state. Within this category of responses, it should be possible to combine experiences from ius commune and from codification, from traditional common law and from the legislation of the New Deal, and to use them towards mastering the challenges from globalization and privatization.
Undoubtedly, there are problems with evolutionary models. One model is evolutionary determinism that makes a certain development look like a necessity, be it a trajectory via the European Union 22 5 to some kind of world state 22 6 and via European law towards world law, 2 2 7 be it a trajectory through ever-growing privatization towards an ever-growing multitude of overlapping legal orders, or be it a steady decline of western law and law in general.
22 8 Such evolutionary determinism has rightly been criticized for importing a teleological element into a predictive theory of law.
2 2 9 Another model is critical rationalism, in which learning from the past and its mistakes helps us create law that comes ever closer to the ideal, although we can never know that ideal.
23 0 Such a model can be criticized as overestimating the potential of reason, especially in the highly complex world and law of Europeanization and globalization. A third model of 221. VAN [Vol. 54evolution comes from systems theory, which describes the evolution of law as neither predetermined nor intrinsically good, but rather as a contingent development, in which how exactly the future takes place before the background of the past is unpredictable. 23 1 This model has been criticized as politically conservative and for leaving insufficient room for individual actions. 2 32 Despite these methodological concerns, renovation is in many ways the most plausible development for private law. Part of this plausibility derives from its breadth and the variety of actual developments possible within it. But although its general core may sound banal, it is relevant and not obvious: the future of private law is unpredictable in its details. It likely will not look like it's past nor like a negation of that past. Nonetheless, it will be shaped by that past, and knowledge of that past will be helpful to master its challenges.
VI. CONCLUSION
The primary aim of this article has been one of organization-to draw together and structure disparate and fragmented debates, and to raise questions that come to light from this organization. Nonetheless, some more general results have emerged.
First, the two assumptions listed in the introduction are both unhelpful; it has become clear that private law requires rethinking, since its roots in the state can no longer be assumed as self-evident. This is obvious for private law outside the state-supranational or non-national, "privatized," private law. However, such rethinking is necessary for the state's private law, too. The state can no longer (if it ever could) be viewed as an all-encompassing entity; it stands in a complex relation with other institutional and social orders, supranational and non-national. This insight makes it hard to argue that private law must ultimately be legitimized and validated entirely by the state. At the same time, seeing how different state private law is from non-state private law makes it hard to argue that private law can be discussed without reference to the state.
Second, the challenges for private law are at least in part different from those for public law. On the one hand, some concerns, like the validity and legitimacy of non-state-law, are less pressing than in public law, because private law is not concerned only with issues of regulation and government. On the other hand, the fact that private law is so often discussed without explicit regard to the role of the state makes it difficult to discuss private law beyond the state. In contrast to public lawyers, who are used to arguing explicitly within the state and therefore know well which of the state's structures 231. Supra note 224; see also the contributions to "Debatte" in Vols. 1 & 2 of RECHTSGESCHICHTE.
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should be replicated or avoided beyond the state, private lawyers have yet to learn which state structures matter.
Third, private law beyond the state is bound to be less coherent and hierarchical, at least to some degree, than private law within the state. This raises new problems for those who seek clear and predictable answers. At the same time, it creates opportunities for those who advocate solutions based on a variety of sources: once private law overcomes its necessary connection with the state, arguments from comparative law, ethics, even economics, present fewer intrinsic problems than within the legal positivism of state private law. Whether freeing private law from the state is an advantage or a disadvantage for private law will ultimately depend on whether satisfactory methods for dealing with the new pluralism can be developed; this is not yet the case.
Fourth, knowledge about the history of private law will be especially helpful for mastering future challenges, beyond the general usefulness of such knowledge. History not only helps in understanding the contemporary relation of private law and the state, which is contingent yet real. Furthermore, experiences with private law, both before the state and under the state, provide us with structures in which we can think fruitfully about private law today; they can also provide a background against which we can evaluate how we should think about private law beyond the state.
These insights are general; they do not resolve more specific questions and problems of private law beyond the state. At the same time, we are convinced that these specific questions and problems cannot be addressed adequately without a clearer conception of what private law beyond the state might be about. This article is a plea for a more general, all-encompassing debate of the effects of Europeanization, globalization, and privatization on the law in general and private law in particular. It should start, not end, such debates.
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